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Abstract 
 
 This master’s thesis explores the representation of the penal state in HBO’s acclaimed TV 
show The Wire. After dismantling the welfare system in the 1990s, the United States of America has 
shifted to a punitive regulation of poverty. This is evidenced by the fact that the incarceration rate 
has increased four times in the span of 25 years, while the crime rates remained stagnant. The 
restriction of welfare was justified by invoking the ideology of personal responsibility and 
stereotypes such as the “welfare queen.” By illustrating the systemic urban inequality of the inner 
city which limits its characters’ individual autonomy, The Wire positions itself against the ideology of 
personal responsibility. Its vast array of complex, three-dimensional characters serves to dispel 
stereotypes of African American residents of the inner city. However, the stereotypical 
representations still persist when the show’s focus shifts to African American mothers. They are 
represented as irresponsible and their desires are linked directly to their sons’ negative outcomes. In 
a rare didactic moment, the series encourages nuclear patriarchal families as the antidote to the 
decaying institutions of the dilapidated American inner city. 
 
Key words: The Wire, penal state, welfare, prisonfare, African American, personal responsibility 
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Introduction 
 
 The United States of America has the highest incarceration rate in the industrialized 
world. This was not always the case; the rate grew exponentially after the revolutionary 
1960s in the post-Civil Rights era. This phenomenon cannot be called ‘mass incarceration’ 
because this would imply proportional incarceration across all social groups. Instead, 
sociologist Loïc Wacquant suggests using the term hyperincarceration in order to capture 
the reality of the carceral expansion that has unevenly targeted poverty-stricken African-
American males. This expansion cannot be explained by a rise in crime since studies have 
shown that crime has actually declined in this period. Neither can it be explained by the 
concept of the ‘Prison Industrial Complex’ since, according to Wacquant, it constitutes a 
fiscal drain and composes a negligible part of the economy. What he suggests instead is that 
the contemporary prison is at its core a political institution installed to absorb the shock of 
the crash of the ghetto, normalize precarious wage labour, and stage the sovereignty of the 
state. This phenomenon of hyperincarceration is inextricably linked to the hyperghetto 
which serves as an instrument of ethnoracial control in the city and the primary recruiting 
grounds for prisons. These two stand in a linked relationship of structural continuity which is 
exemplified by the fact that seven in ten American convicts are rearrested.  
 One of the causes of hyperincarceration was the breakdown of public institutions 
such as welfare, which was replaced by workfare and prisonfare. The disintegration of public 
institutions is one of the main overarching themes in The Wire, an American crime drama 
television series set and produced in Baltimore, Maryland. Each of its five seasons 
introduces a different institution and its relationship to law enforcement. The two major 
groups of characters that remain constant throughout the entire show are the Baltimore 
Police Department and the Barksdale criminal organization. These aspects make it a suitable 
narrative for analysing the penal state, which is the goal of this master’s thesis. The thesis is 
divided into three chapters. The first chapter provides a historical overview of the welfare 
system in the 20th century. It also examines the ideological justifications for welfare reform, 
such as the stereotype of the “welfare queen” and the ideology of personal responsibility. 
The second chapter provides an overview of the penal state in the USA. It is mostly based on 
the work of Loïc Wacquant who argues that the aggressive rolling out of prisons and its 
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extensions is a response to the failure of the state on economic and social fronts as well as a 
way to neutralize the social insecurities of the post-industrial era. The final chapter 
examines the representation of the penal state in The Wire, focusing on the ideology of 
personal responsibility. It asserts that the series positions itself against that ideology by 
illustrating the systemic urban inequality which prevents characters from acting according 
to their moral values and beliefs. The only exceptions to this representation are African 
American mothers; they are represented through stereotypes of the black matriarch and 
the “welfare queen” which were promoted by the Moynihan Report and proponents of 
punitive welfare reform in the 1990s.  
 
1. History and Cultural Representation of Welfare in the USA 
 
1.1. A Brief Overview of Welfare Reform in the 20th century 
 
 When Bill Clinton signed into law the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) in 1996 “ending welfare as we know it,” it was not without 
controversy. He was criticized by Democrats and Republicans alike, as well as labour unions, 
religious groups and organizations representing women, minorities and immigrants. Their 
criticism was justified – the bill ended a six decades old entitlement that guaranteed any 
eligible impoverished family to receive cash assistance and shifted the responsibility of 
welfare from the federal level to the states. In order for such a historic and controversial bill 
to have passed, it had to have been supported by an electorate which held negative views of 
welfare recipients. These negative public views were bolstered by racist and discriminatory 
stereotypes such as the “welfare queen” and by equating welfare recipients to drug addicts. 
 Bill Clinton was not the first president who compared welfare to addiction. When he 
spoke of the “cycle of dependence,” he was merely echoing the words of Franklin D. 
Roosevelt who said (in his 1935 State of the Union address) that “continued dependence 
upon relief induces a spiritual and moral disintegration fundamentally destructive to the 
national fibre.” He continued: “To dole out relief in this way is to administer a narcotic, a 
subtle destroyer of the human spirit.” However, Roosevelt made it clear that there were 
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two groups of unemployed people dependent on welfare. The first group consisted of about 
a million and a half people who could not support themselves “for the most part, through 
no fault of their own.” He expressed that they had to be cared for as they were before, on 
the local level. This included states, counties, towns, cities, churches and private welfare 
agencies. The second group was comprised of around three and a half million employable 
people: “This group was the victim of a nation-wide depression caused by conditions which 
were not local but national.” There was no talk of “welfare queens” or “teenage moms.“ 
However, the Social Security Act was also not without fault. This is where the racist attitudes 
towards welfare recipients had started. 
 In order to understand the racist attitudes towards contemporary welfare recipients, 
we need to comprehend the circumstances of welfare reform at the beginning of the 
twentieth century. There were three major welfare reforms in the twentieth century that 
preceded PRWORA; the social policies of the Progressive Era, the New Deal, and the Great 
Society. In the Progressive Era, African Americans were “almost universally excluded from 
state-level Progressive social policies such as mothers’ pensions” (Lieberman 24). Most of 
them lived in the South and were denied civil and political rights under the violent 
repression of Jim Crow segregation. The Social Security Act of 1935, signed in by President 
Roosevelt, created the first permanent national welfare policies. It was a part of the New 
Deal, which pursued an agenda familiar to that of many European countries; social 
insurance, labour rights, and economic regulation. The Roosevelt administration proposed 
the following: 
 
 (…) a widely inclusive set of social policies under national control, combining fully 
 national social insurance for all workers with financial support for state public 
 assistance policies such as mothers’ pensions, under terms that would give the 
 federal government substantial administrative and political leverage. (Lieberman 36) 
 
Southern congressional leaders found this unacceptable because it would enable southern 
African American workers to come into direct contact with the national state, thus 
mobilizing a class coalition against the racial hegemony. At this time, as in much of the 
twentieth century, white southerners had disproportionate influence over national politics 
due to the organization of Congress. They controlled key congressional committees, 
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generally voted with other Democrats and perpetually re-elected Democrats in the one-
party South. This mechanism allowed the segregated, white supremacist South to 
disenfranchise African Americans. Thanks to this mechanism, they denied the majority of 
African Americans access to Social Security coverage by excluding domestic and agricultural 
workers. Furthermore, they removed federal controls over state public assistance. The 
result was “a structurally limited, decentralized, and bifurcated welfare system that 
perpetuated African American dependence on local political and economic elites for their 
livelihoods” (ibid.). What made this possible were cross-class coalitions formed by whites in 
order to shape national politics and pursue their interests. Coalitions like these were central 
to the development of the American welfare state:  
 
 (…) even though African Americans were nominal partners in the New Deal coalition 
 (although not solidly until 1936 or even after), the imperatives of racial dominance 
 outweighed conventional class position in defining interests and cleavages in the 
 social politics of the 1930s. (ibid.) 
 
 The most important program introduced by the Social Security Act was the Aid to 
Dependent Children, later renamed to Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). This 
was the primary source of assistance for poor children and their parents. However, states 
were given control of AFDC benefits and eligibility, which enabled them to heavily 
discriminate against African Americans. For example, receipt of aid was often denied to 
children of poor African American women if a man was living in the house. By doing this, the 
states punished women for their sexual behaviour and controlled their sexuality. This 
discrimination at the state level was greatly expanded in the 1990s, which prompted social 
scientists to conclude that “federalism has been one of the chief bulwarks of racial 
domination in the United States” (Brown 56). Nevertheless, the situation was much 
different during the 1960s in the time of Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society.  
 During this time, the AFDC caseload more than tripled. This was enabled by “a 
number of social and political forces, including the acquisition of political power by African 
Americans, the massive waves of urban political violence, the welfare rights movement, and 
the liberal mood of the 1960s” (Fording 75). The Great Society liberals raised the federal 
contributions to grants-in-aid, launched new programs and removed the federal cap on 
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public assistance payments to states. By doing so, they stimulated spending by state and 
increased public investment in education, job training, and neighbourhood facilities in poor 
ghetto communities. Furthermore, the Supreme Court rectified the state control of female 
sexuality by limiting the state authority to “arbitrarily deny poor women benefits or make a 
woman’s sexual behaviour a condition of aid” (Brown 60). As a result, the number of poor 
women and children receiving aid rose “from about 3 million in 1960 to almost 11 million by 
1973” (Brown 61). These liberal reforms and their consequences received criticisms that 
AFDC created work disincentives, which eventually fuelled the backlash of the 1990s. 
 Another preconceived notion that provided intellectual justification for the backlash 
was the belief that the structure of the African American family was to blame for black 
poverty. This debate was famously ignited by The Negro Family: The Case for National 
Action, better known as the Moynihan Report, named after its author, Daniel Patrick 
Moynihan. The report, originally published in 1965, has remained controversial to this day. 
There have been contrasting interpretations of the author’s original intention, evidenced by 
the fact that the report has been invoked by Barack Obama as well as Paul Ryan to support 
their arguments. Moynihan himself has been clear about at least one thing: his assertion 
that the matriarchal structure of the African American family “retards the progress of the 
group as a whole, and imposes a crushing burden on the Negro male and, in consequence, 
on a great many Negro women as well.” According to him, the matriarchal structure was not 
problematic in itself; he saw the problem in the fact that the minority group of African 
Americans operates on one principle while the majority of the population operates on the 
opposite principle. In the broadest terms, he suggested that there should be a “national 
effort” which would “strengthen the Negro family so as to enable it to raise and support its 
members as do other families.” The ambiguity of the report opened it to multiple 
contradictory interpretations. The left embraced its call for new federal policies but 
criticized it for providing “scientific legitimacy and government sanction to a view of black 
families as pathological” (Klug). Conservatives, who ignored Moynihan’s call for a federal 
intervention in the labour market, used the report to blame America’s racial problems on 
black communities themselves, rather than institutional racism. In short, the Moynihan 
Report was short-lived as policy, but it greatly shaped the discourse on race in the post-Civil 
rights era, including the discourse preceding PRWORA. 
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 According to the official narrative, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act was supposed to address the work disincentives created by the Great 
Society and particularly the AFDC. Conservatives argued that AFDC encouraged laziness, 
unemployment, dependency, and a decline of moral values and personal responsibility. 
PRWORA was supposed to curb this by helping welfare recipients (especially African 
American single mothers) attain personal responsibility by entering the workforce. 
However, it is clear from the results of the reform that its goal was exclusively to reduce 
caseloads and spending on welfare. It became obvious that Conservatives had no interest in 
eradicating poverty; doing so through a work-conditioned policy would possibly be even 
more expensive than an open-ended grant because forcing poor women into the labour 
market would require “substantial public investment in day care, employment training and 
education, health services, and a variety of social services” (Brown 50). What they have 
done instead was replace the AFDC entitlement with Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families (TANF)—a block grant—and added requirements such as “time limits on the receipt 
of aid, work requirements for able-bodied adult recipients, and a host of other requirements 
designed to force welfare recipients to act more ‘responsibly’ while receiving aid” (Fording 
72). Since states can keep the federal money from the block grant which they do not spend 
on welfare, they are incentivized not only to reduce caseloads, but also to reduce spending. 
Furthermore, the new regulations allowed states more discretion in reallocating the funds, 
which also allowed them to reduce spending on welfare programs. For example, states like 
Wisconsin and Connecticut shifted federal dollars into welfare and reduced state spending 
(Brown 66). Another study found that six states used TANF funds “to pay for services 
previously funded with state monies and then used the savings for tax cuts among other 
gifts to the middle class” (ibid.). Other states have simply failed “to spend all allocated 
federal funds and have accumulated large unobligated balances” (ibid.). 
 Even though the caseloads plummeted, a comparable decline in poverty rates has 
not occurred and neither has an increase in wages. Whites have left the rolls faster than 
blacks, which resulted in a caseload composed mostly of women of color. This was due to 
the discriminatory practices on the state level, but also due to the actual concentration of 
poverty in the USA. The causes of racialized poverty are well-known among researchers: 
“loss of jobs in inner cities, declining demand for unskilled labour, racially segregated 
neighbourhoods” and “public disinvestment in ghetto communities” (Brown 50). However, 
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these causes do not appear to be that well-known to whites, who tend to view poor blacks 
through racial stereotypes:  
 
 Among white Americans, black people are more likely to be seen as lazy (Gilens 
 1999); if poor, they are more likely than whites to be judged personally responsible 
 for their poverty (Iyengar 1990) and less likely to be seen as deserving public 
 assistance. (Fording et al. 10) 
 
Due to racialized poverty, any race-neutral policy will fail to provide benefits to those who 
need them the most; poor inner city black and Latino communities. In order to truly 
eradicate poverty, a nation-wide race-specific policy that targeted the racially segregated 
urban communities where poverty is concentrated would have to be established. However, 
the anti-black stereotypes have resulted in a significant portion of whites opposing race-
specific policies. This is why state politicians have no incentives to create a policy that would 
truly address the roots of poverty and why “only national policies can address race and 
poverty” (Brown 70).  
 
2.2. Cultural Representations of Welfare 
 
 So far we have analysed the welfare reforms in the twentieth century and the 
political mechanisms underpinning them. However, in order for these welfare policies to be 
made into law, they have to be supported by the electorate. We have concluded that the 
welfare reform of the 1990s was a return to the racist and punitive measures of the 1930s 
after a period of the rule of law in the middle of the century. According to the official 
narrative, welfare created dependency and perpetuated poverty by creating a lazy, immoral, 
irresponsible underclass that would rather live off government money than find work. We 
know that this is not the true cause of poverty, which begs the following question: why are 
these racist attitudes and stereotypes so widespread among whites? Social scientists argue 
that these longstanding racist stereotypes were partly bolstered by the mass media (TV and 
newspapers) from the sixties onwards and partly by politicians who wanted to capitalize on 
white fears in order to build a new conservative majority. 
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 In his analysis of the news media from the 1950s to the 1990s, Martin Gilens 
concluded that the representation of African Americans in news articles on poverty 
increased when articles were critical and decreased when the coverage was more 
sympathetic. As a direct consequence, this helped associate African Americans with the 
“undeserving poor” in the eyes of white America and perpetuated racist stereotypes that 
black people were lazy. Prior to the analysed period, black poverty was ignored by whites 
even though African Americans have always been disproportionately poor. As Gilens proves, 
this has changed dramatically in the middle of the twentieth century, even though the 
average percentage of African Americans among the poor remained constant at around 30 
percent: “From only 27 percent in 1964, the proportion of African Americans in pictures of 
the poor increased to 49 percent and 53 percent in 1965 and 1966, and then to 72 percent 
black in 1967” (“Race and the Politics of Welfare Reform” 110). Several things have 
happened in the 1960s that facilitated this shift in representation. Historical changes such as 
black migration to the North (particularly to the cities), the civil rights movement and the 
urban riots of the mid-1960s all helped increase the visibility of African Americans. Another 
factor that enabled the racialization of poverty images was the changing racial composition 
of AFDC: 
 
 The percentage of African Americans among ADC/AFDC recipients increased steadily 
 from about 14 percent in 1936 to about 45 percent in 1969, after which point the 
 proportion of blacks declined slowly until it reached 36 percent in 1995. During the 
 middle to late 1960s, then, African Americans made up a very substantial minority 
 of AFDC recipients. (Gilens, “Race and the Politics of Welfare Reform” 105) 
 
However, these were merely the conditions and not the causes that enabled the 
racialization. The actual cause of the racialization was the increase of negative stories on 
poverty, which disproportionately featured African Americans. As the public opinion on War 
on Poverty turned negative, many stories about waste, inefficiency or abuse of welfare were 
published. Gilens theorized that newsmagazine writers, editors and photographers 
associated these negative stories with African Americans due to the longstanding 
stereotypes that blacks are not committed to the work ethic and ideas of personal 
responsibility. He claims that white opposition to welfare stems from the misperception 
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that it rewards the “undeserving poor:” “Whites oppose welfare not because they think it 
primarily benefits blacks, but because they think it benefits blacks who prefer to live off the 
government rather than work” (Gilens, “Why Americans Hate Welfare” 4). These 
misperceptions, bolstered by racist media images, influenced public policies and shaped the 
punitive system of PRWORA. It is also important to notice that the views represented in 
these media images primarily reflect the values of the upper class since media organizations 
are privately owned and operated for profit. Consequently, if the attitudes of the working 
and middle class differed from those of the upper class, they would not be equally 
represented in the news media. 
 Who are the “undeserving poor” that comprised the majority of welfare recipients 
according to white Americans? This is not a novel concept; the division of poor people into 
moral categories is a nineteenth century invention. In order to distribute limited resources 
allocated for the poor, a category of the undeserving poor was conceived. This subset of the 
poor was considered undeserving of public assistance due to their perceived moral failings 
and irresponsible behaviour. The concept was reinvented in the twentieth century through 
the notion of the “underclass.” This notion also assumed the existence of a subset of the 
poor deemed undeserving due to high levels of drug abuse, criminal behaviour, 
unemployment, and teenage pregnancy. Since social scientists were unable to formulate an 
alternative concept for the disintegration of inner cities and their communities, the 
underclass became a widely accepted term. This term, however, is not neutral - it deflects 
attention from the structural origins of poverty by ascribing it to the moral failings of the 
impoverished and thus blames the victims. This, in turn, constrains the formulation of 
constructive policy. Furthermore, the “underclass” is not a class in any of the senses and 
lacks intellectual substance. It is misleading because it confines structural transformations 
that are reshaping the entire country to a small segment of the population (Katz). 
 Another manner in which stereotypes and racist attitudes are perpetuated is by way 
of “controlling images.” These are socially constructed images “designed to make racism, 
sexism, poverty, and other forms of social injustice appear to be natural, normal, and 
inevitable parts of everyday life” (Sparks 176). They serve as a shorthand for “interpreting, 
shaping, stigmatizing—and thereby controlling—the actions of marginalized groups” (ibid.). 
Holloway Sparks argued that four controlling images dominated the discourse of the reform 
debate in the 1990s. These are the “welfare queen,” “teenage mom,” “deadbeat dad,” and 
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“noncitizen.” The most influential one was the image of the “welfare queen,” which 
targeted poor women of color. Ronald Reagan is often attributed as the original author of 
this stereotype, since he invoked it in numerous speeches. Although journalists refuted the 
veracity of his story, it still prevailed. Similar to it was the news story of the “Chicago 19,” a 
story about five African American welfare mothers and one African American man abusing 
nineteen children in Chicago. This story was not false but events like these were certainly 
not a widespread phenomenon as the news outlets made it seem. Still, the public selectively 
gravitated to images like these “in order to validate [their] own race and gender 
perceptions” (Sparks 194). These controlling images painted the recipients of welfare 
programs as the villains and not the victims, which dissuaded them from participating in the 
welfare debate. Of the nearly 600 witnesses that participated in the congressional hearings, 
only 17 were welfare recipients, and only four of them were still receiving AFDC (Sparks 
184).  
 Even though the discourse of welfare reform appeared neutral, upon closer 
inspection it revealed discrimination hidden underneath. It purports to apply the neutral 
standard of “personal responsibility” equally to all members of society, which fails to 
address race, gender, and class privileges. Proponents of PRWORA posit that the only way to 
assume personal responsibility and self-sufficiency is by taking paid employment. This is 
discriminating towards women, African-Americans and impoverished communities because 
paid employment is not equally available to all citizens due to the way existing social 
relations are structured. It is much harder for poor women of color to conform to this idea 
since the jobs available to them may not pay enough to support a family or may require 
them to leave children without parental supervision and care. Furthermore, the discourse of 
personal responsibility implies that raising children is not work. The result of this 
discriminatory welfare policy is that the stereotype of the welfare queen becomes a self-
fulfilling prophecy: 
 
 As Barbara Cruikshank has emphasized, overly stringent and punitive rules, elaborate 
 procedures for determining eligibility, extensive reporting requirements, 
 surveillance, behavioural standards, work requirements, and the like all combine to 
 create the near-impossibility of being on welfare and not being seen as a rule-
 violating welfare queen. (Schram 55) 
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The welfare queen is not real, but the myth itself has real consequences, as well as 
ideological purposes. Sanford Schram asserts that it is used in order to “delegitimize welfare 
use by single mothers and to perpetuate the ideal of the traditional two-parent family and 
the maintenance of the family-wage system” (29). It serves to dissuade poor African 
American women’s dependence on the state by reinforcing the idea of their dependence on 
men. Furthermore, the family-wage system is also not neutral. It is biased in favour of 
“middle- and upper-class, male-headed, white families that tend to be able to conform to 
this model” (Schram 27). However, the most important reason why its proponents 
perpetuated this myth was because the discourse of personal responsibility needed a 
scapegoat:  
 
 As an abstraction disconnected from the real lives of people, personal responsibility 
 desperately needs to be able to associate itself with embodied identities in order to 
 make itself credible. (Schram 53) 
 
In itself, “personal responsibility” is nothing but a “cultural placeholder that the culture can 
fill as it deems appropriate,” which is exactly why it needs a personification in the form of a 
welfare queen (Schram 33). Since it is no longer socially acceptable to be openly racist, such 
views and policies need to be encoded in euphemisms in order to be disseminated. The idea 
of personal responsibility poses as neutral but discriminates on the basis of gender, race and 
class because it is applied evenly to all citizens without taking into account the uneven 
distribution of social capital. Furthermore, it is paradoxical because it implies “being willing 
to take responsibility for what the dominant culture has already assigned as one’s 
responsibility, and on terms predetermined by the culture” (Schram 31). Similarly, the 
discourse of citizenship invoked by the proponents of PRWORA was also discriminatory. It 
was based on the influential ideas of political scientist Lawrence Mead who claimed that 
“most vulnerable Americans need obligations, as much as rights, if they are to move as 
equals on the stage of American life” (Sparks 188). Inspired by his ideas, proponents of 
PRWORA insisted on a contractual account of citizenship. Their idea of a contract was 
paradoxical, Holloway Sparks argues, because a contract implies a free exchange between 
equals. In their contract, the state had all the power and the other side was positioned only 
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to accept or refuse the “agreement.” Since they were often lacking even the most basic 
means of subsistence, they were not in the position to refuse the discriminating contract. 
Schram concludes: 
 
 In this sense, personal responsibility is not a rational, coherent, objective, neutral 
 idea so much as a culturally acquired, and culturally biased, understanding of what it 
 means to be a person in a given social order. (32) 
 
 The consequences of the 1996 welfare reform and the discourse that followed it are 
still felt more than twenty years after it was enacted. TANF was successful in getting families 
off welfare rolls (especially white families) – the number of families receiving aid decreased 
by 75 percent from 1996 – but not in reducing poverty rates (Edin). The funding for TANF 
remained at $16.5 billion per year but due to inflation this amount has declined by 30 
percent. Only a fraction of poor American families are receiving help from the program – the 
national average is around 22 percent (Carter). The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities 
has discovered that only a half of federal and state TANF funds are being spent on providing 
aid to families in need through child care, meeting the essential needs of families and 
connecting families to work. The rest is spent on filling budget holes and on programs that 
do not support low-income families (Schott et al.). Poor Americans have responded to this 
by developing what Kathryn J. Edin has called survival strategies. Some are selling metal and 
aluminium to scrap dealers. Selling plasma has reached an all-time high in 2014 (Edin). Food 
pantry user rates have nearly doubled since 1999 (Barocio). An alternative economy has 
developed in inner cities, with drugs as the main commodity. This broken welfare system 
has not erased the racist stereotypes; seventy-one percent of Americans still agreed in 2003 
that “welfare benefits make poor people dependent and encourage them to stay poor” 
(Gershon). It is safe to say that the system reinforced those stereotypes:  
 
 Rather than eliminating the myth of the welfare queen, these reforms codified it by 
 shaping policy choices around the prevention of willful idleness and criminal 
 behaviour. As a result, welfare reform created a system that expects the worst from 
 families seeking assistance, and in so doing further entrenches a presumed link 
 between poverty and poor character in popular discourse. (Black) 
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America’s safety net has been shredded, and in the next chapter we are going to see how it 
has been replaced by the prison system.  
 
2. Overview of the Penal State in the USA 
 
2.1. The Shift from Workfare to Prisonfare 
 
 In the previous chapter we have analysed the contraction of the welfare state, which 
culminated in the 1990s with the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act. This contraction was complemented by another phenomenon - the 
expansion of the penal state. The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 
also signed into law by Bill Clinton, marked the single largest increase in penal sanctions in 
the history of the United States. This expansion was funded by the No Frills Prison Act of 
1995, which also eliminated incentives to rehabilitation. The simultaneous contraction of 
the welfare state and expansion of the penal state was not a coincidence; it was a deliberate 
shift from the single regulation of the poor by the maternalist arm of the social state to “the 
double regulation of poverty through the paternalist action of restrictive ‘workfare’ and 
expansive ‘prisonfare’” (Wacquant, “Wedding of Workfare and Prisonfare Revisited” 207). 
Before the expansion of the penal state, poverty was managed by expanding or contracting 
the state relief programs according to the ups and downs of the economy; the expansions of 
welfare programs subdued the threats to the social order while the restrictions aimed to 
enforce work norms by pushing recipients back onto the labour market. In his 2009 book 
Punishing the Poor, sociologist Loïc Wacquant asserts that this model explained the two 
major welfare explosions and worked well in the 20th century but no longer holds true: 
 
 In the age of fragmented labor, hypermobile capital, and sharpening social 
 inequalities and anxieties, the “central role of relief in the regulation of marginal 
 labor and in the maintenance of social order” is displaced and duly supplemented by 
 the vigorous deployment of the police, the courts, and the prison in the nether 
 regions of social space. (Wacquant, “Bordieu, Foucault, and the Penal State” 118) 
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Instead of cyclical contractions and expansions of public aid, we have been witnessing the 
continual contraction of welfare (replaced by workfare in 1996) and expansion of prisonfare 
since the 1990s. Wacquant describes prisonfare as “the rolling out of the police, the courts, 
and custodial institutions and their extensions to contain the brewing urban disorders that 
the state itself has spawned or aggravated by retracting the social safety net and 
deregulating the low-wage labor market” (Wacquant, “Prisoner Reentry as Myth and 
Ceremony” 616). These extensions of prisons include probation—community supervision of 
adult offenders through a probation agency—and parole, the conditional release of 
prisoners who serve the remaining portion of their sentence in the community. Both 
probationers and parolees can be under active supervision, which means they must 
regularly report to a probation or parole officer. Just like recipients of workfare, adults 
under community supervision have to fulfil certain conditions of their supervision (e.g., 
payment of fines, fees or court costs, participation in treatment programs) and adhere to 
specific rules of conduct; otherwise they risk reincarceration. Prisonfare also includes 
surveillance through computerized criminal databases. One of those is the Combined DNA 
Index System (CODIS) - the national DNA database from crime scenes and convicts compiled 
by the FBI. Its reach has doubled from 2005 to 2010 to contain eight million offender 
profiles. These databases, combined with probation, parole and laws restricting access to 
public housing, welfare support, educational grants, and voting to ex-inmates extend the 
reach of the penal state far away from prisons. Furthermore, both probation and parole are 
more likely to lead back to imprisonment than not. This can be due to offenders committing 
a new offense but also due to failing to meet an administrative condition of their release. 
This can include “failing an alcohol test or losing a job, missing an appointment with their 
parole officer, or traveling outside of their county of assignment without permission” 
(Wacquant, “Class, Race and Hyperincarceration” 76). As we have seen in the first chapter of 
this thesis, overly restrictive and punitive conditions regulating welfare recipients only 
reinforce the negative stereotypes of them. The same is true for adults under community 
supervision. Apart from reinforcing negative stereotypes, these conditions often result in 
their reincarceration: 
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 The purpose and functioning of parole have changed drastically over the past thirty 
 years, from spring toward rehabilitation to penal trap, so that parole is now properly 
 construed as an extension of the custodial system, rather than an alternative to it. 
 (ibid.) 
 
 The double punitive regulation of poverty through workfare and prisonfare is not at 
all surprising when we consider the structural, functional, and cultural similarities between 
these two strands of government action. First of all, both the institutions of poor relief and 
penal confinement have been developed in the sixteenth century in order to regulate the 
dislocations caused by the transition from feudalism to capitalism. This was evident in the 
last two decades of the twentieth century when both institutions were overhauled to 
regulate the socioeconomic dislocations of the post-Civil rights era. Secondly, both 
institutions use behaviourist methods such as deterrence, surveillance, abridgment of 
privacy, and graduated sanctions in order to produce desired behaviour. These methods 
stigmatize their recipients because of the implication that they are “guilty until proven 
innocent,” which reinforces the negative stereotypes. Thirdly, both institutions are tasked 
with regulating the people at the bottom of the class and ethnic hierarchy:  
 
 Recipients of AFDC (the main targeted welfare program until 1996) and jail inmates 
 both live near, or below, 50% of the federal poverty line (for one-half and two-thirds 
 of them, respectively); both are disproportionately black and hispanic (37% and 18% 
 for inmates versus 41% and 19% for welfare recipients); the majority did not finish 
 high school and are saddled with serious physical and mental disabilities interfering 
 with their participation in the workforce (44% of AFDC mothers as against 37% of jail 
 inmates). (Wacquant, “Bordieu, Foucault, and the Penal State” 119) 
 
This socioeconomic structure of welfare recipients and inmates shows that they are the two 
gendered components of the same population, living in the same neighbourhoods and 
households; the maternal arm of the government forces women into insecure employment 
while the paternal arm encloses their boyfriends, brothers, husbands and sons. Lastly, both 
workfare and prisonfare are people processing institutions; Along with the “penalization” of 
welfare described in the first chapter, the prison has undergone a process of “welfarization” 
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over the past 30 years, which has facilitated their convergence into a single institutional 
mesh. While the penal turn in welfare has been characterized by restricted entry into the 
system, shorter stays on the rolls and faster exits, the prison system has followed the 
opposite route: entry into jail and prison has been greatly expanded, stays have been 
lengthened and releases curtailed: 
 
 The operant purpose of welfare shifted from passive “people processing” to active 
 “people-changing” after 1988 (…) while the  prison has travelled in the other 
 direction, from aiming to reform inmates (under the philosophy of 
 rehabilitation, hegemonic from the 1920s to the mid-1970s) to merely 
 warehousing them (as the function of punishment was downgraded to retribution 
 and neutralization). (ibid.) 
 
The replacement of welfare with prisonfare is best illustrated by examining the funding for 
each program over the years. In 1980, the combined funding for AFDC and food stamps, two 
main assistance programs, was 22 billion dollars, which was three times greater than the 
carceral budget in that year ($7 billion). Conversely, by 1996, the carceral budget jumped to 
54 billion dollars while AFDC and food stamps amounted to $20 billion and $27 billion 
respectively. Likewise, during the 1990s, the government reduced funding for public housing 
by 61 percent and increased the carceral budget by 171 percent, “effectively making the 
construction of prisons the nation’s main housing program for the poor” (Wacquant, “Class, 
Race and Hyperincarceration” 77). 
 The main result of the shift to prisonfare is the explosion of the inmate population. 
The number of inmates went from around 380,000 in 1975 to 2 million in 2000, making the 
USA the undisputed leader in incarceration in the industrialized world. This incarceration 
rate has remained at around the same level since then. In 2016, probation and parole 
affected additional 4.5 million Americans which brought the total number of persons 
supervised by U.S. correctional systems to over 6.5 million (Kaeble). As opposed to previous 
periods of carceral inflation, when the surge has been fuelled by lengthening the average 
sentence, this one has been fuelled primarily by the increase in jail and prison admissions. 
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2.2. Hyperincarceration and the Hyperghetto 
 
 The coupling of workfare and prisonfare in the 1990s was followed by another 
phenomenon; the coupling of hyperghettoization and hyperincarceration. In order to 
understand this second convergence, we have to point out the similarities between the two 
institutions. As previously mentioned, the prison was not developed to prevent crime, but 
to “dramatize the authority of rulers, and to repress idleness and enforce morality among 
vagrants, beggars, and assorted categories cast adrift by the advent of capitalism” 
(Wacquant, “Class, Race and Hyperincarceration” 80). Similarly, the ghetto is not an 
accidental creation; it is a “sociospatial contraption through which a dominant ethnic 
category secludes a subordinate group and restricts its life chances in order to both exploit 
and exclude it from the life-sphere of the dominant“ (ibid. 81). It follows from this that both 
prison and the ghetto are institutions of forced confinement, used by the dominant 
class/ethnic group to subjugate lower class groups (in the case of prison) and groups at the 
bottom of the ethnic hierarchy (in the ghetto). Both institutions use stigma, constraint, 
spatial confinement and institutional encasement in order to achieve their goal of social 
ostracization. The ghetto was the third “peculiar institution,” coming after chattel slavery 
and Jim Crow, entrusted with “defining, confining, and controlling African Americans in the 
urban industrial order” (ibid.). When it imploded in the 1960s, the government rolled out 
the prison and its extensions in order to contain a population widely regarded as dangerous.  
 The reasons for the collapse of the ghetto as an ethnoracial enclosure are threefold. 
Firstly, the post-industrial economic transition made African American workers redundant 
because it shifted employment “from manufacturing to services, from central city to suburb, 
and from the Rustbelt to the Sunbelt and low-wage foreign countries” (ibid.). Secondly, their 
political influence diminished due to migrations of white middle-class populations to the 
suburbs. White flight weakened cities in the national electoral system and enabled state 
disinvestment from inner city communities. Lastly, African American protest facilitated the 
breakdown of the ghetto through the urban riots that shook up the country between 1964 
and 1968. These riots, combined with growing frustration over stagflation and social 
insecurity, prompted whites to support “law and order” measures that facilitated the 
convergence of prison with the hyperghetto. Therefore, the collapse of the ghetto was not a 
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result of a concerted government effort; it was left to crumble onto itself under the weight 
of poverty, unemployment and crime caused by the “joint withdrawal of the wage-labour 
market and the welfare state” (ibid.). 
 The convergence of hyperincarcerization and the hyperghetto is evident in the 
statistics; seven in ten convicts that leave American prisons are rearrested. As described in 
the previous subsection, American inmates are some of the most disadvantaged members 
of the society; they are disproportionately homeless, mentally ill, addicted to substances, 
uneducated, and poor. This social profile points to the fact that they were not integrated 
into society before incarceration. There can be no talk of ‘‘pathways of reintegration’’ into 
the society if most of the inmates were not integrated in the first place, since there is no 
viable social structure for them to be integrated into. Instead of reentry or reintegration, 
most inmates experience on-going circulation between prison and the hyperghetto:  
 
 For lower-class black convicts, who supply the largest contingent of admissions, the 
 bloated prison and the barren hyperghetto stand in a linked relationship of structural 
 continuity, functional surrogacy, and cultural syncretism. (Wacquant, “Prisoner 
 Reentry as Myth and Ceremony” 611) 
 
2.3. Causes of the Penal Turn 
 
 Before we explain what caused the double convergence between workfare and 
prisonfare on one side and hyperincarcerization and the hyperghetto on the other, we 
should consider the ways in which researchers previously tried to explain this phenomenon. 
The traditional explanation is that the stupendous rise in incarceration is a result of the 
increase in crime. This is not the case; the data shows that the crime rates remained stable 
from 1975 to 2000, which means that the country became around four times more punitive 
in 25 years. The data also shows that the punitiveness for “index crimes” (violent crime and 
major categories of property crime) has increased by 495 percent, which means that most 
of this increase in punitiveness has targeted marginal delinquents committing lesser 
offenses (Wacquant, “Class, Race and Hyperincarceration” 80).  
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 The second popular explanation is that the number of inmates has increased in order 
to generate profit for private prisons and companies exploiting inmate labour. This 
explanation, labelled the “Prison-Industrial Complex” in analogy to the Military-Industrial 
Complex, also falls apart upon a closer investigation. First of all, there is no justice 
equivalent for the Pentagon; legal punishment in America is governed not by a single entity 
but through a decentralized network of agencies. The components of the penal chain (the 
police, courts, and corrections) are fragmented not only geographically, but also 
institutionally and bureaucratically. Secondly, even with the grotesque overcrowding of 
publicly owned prisons, private prison firms managed to house only 6% of total inmates at 
their peak. Finally, none of the companies involved in prison labour rely on it; at its peak, 
fewer than 5,000 inmates were employed by private firms, which constitutes less than one 
percent of the total inmate population. The reason why the state has not abdicated its 
power to imprison its constituents is because the prison is a political institution, not an 
economic one; its main function is in “dramatizing collective norms, asserting political 
authority, and staging the sovereignty of the state” (Wacquant, “Prisoner Reentry as Myth 
and Ceremony” 611). This conclusion leads us to the actual reasons for the rise in 
incarceration in the USA.  
 The key to understanding the causes of hyperincarceration is in the composition of 
the incarcerated population; it reveals that the penal state has not indiscriminately targeted 
all groups across the class or race continuum as the term ‘mass incarceration’ misleadingly 
implies. It has been common knowledge for some time that African Americans are 
disproportionately represented among the population behind bars. This is certainly true, 
since blacks represent 33 percent of the sentenced prison population even though they 
constitute only 12 percent of the U.S. adult population, according to data from 2016 
(Gramlich). However, this should not obscure the fact that inmates are first of all poor 
people. As previously mentioned, two-thirds of inmates come from households with an 
annual income less than half the poverty line. Only 13 percent of inmates have 
postsecondary education and fewer than half held a full-time job at the time of arrest. 
Furthermore, African American males without completed secondary education are twelve 
times as likely to serve time in prison as African American males who went to college (58.9 
percent versus 4.9 percent); the data undeniably shows that “class disproportionality inside 
each ethnic category is greater than the racial disproportionality between them” 
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(Wacquant, “Class, Race and Hyperincarceration” 80). The composition of the incarcerated 
population has not always looked like this; from 70 percent white at the close of World War 
II, the ethnoracial composition has completely reversed to 70 percent African American and 
Latino by the end of the century. This is especially confounding if we take into account the 
fact that the criminal population has both shrunk and become whiter during that period:  
 
 (…) the share of African Americans among individuals arrested by the police for the 
 four most serious violent offenses (murder, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault) 
 dropped from 51 percent in 1973 to 43 percent in 1996, and it continued to decline 
 steadily for each of those four crimes until at least 2006. (ibid. 79) 
 
 If crime has not increased, what can explain the fourfold increase in punitiveness of 
the country, finely targeted at specific class and ethnic groups? When we consider the fact 
that the specific class and ethnic group targeted by the penal state are lower-class blacks, 
who are no longer enclosed by the ghetto, it becomes clear that the penal turn was initiated 
as a response to the post-Civil rights urban riots and the collapse of the ghetto as an 
ethnoracial container. The penal turn was fuelled by demands for “law and order” measures 
in the wake of anti-war protests, racial upheavals and street crime but it was a response to 
social insecurity, not criminal insecurity; penal confinement was not meant to offer relief to 
the poor but relief from the poor. The catalyst that facilitated the abrupt ascent of the penal 
state in the USA is the unique racial segregation that isolates African Americans in physical, 
social and symbolic space. This rigid spatial isolation of an ethnical minority group makes it 
easier to pass punitive regulations that mostly affect those groups since the majority of the 
electorate does not identify with them; they are perceived as “undeserving” and non-
citizens under the new contractual definition of citizenship. The same factors that 
influenced the contraction of welfare have influenced the expansion of prisonfare:  
 
 the generalized degradation of labor and the depth of social inequality, the 
 bureaucratic splintering and rampant commodification of public goods, the 
 unusually high levels of both class and ethnic segregation in the metropolis, the hold 
 of a religiously inflected moral individualism, and the categorical and castigating 
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 character of state programs aimed at the poor, who are suspected by definition of 
 being “undeserving” (Wacquant, “Wedding of Workfare and Prisonfare” 205). 
 
 Prisonfare as explained here is not an accidental creation; it is one of the core 
components of the new neoliberal state. The three components other than prisonfare are 
market rule, workfare and the cultural trope of “personal responsibility” that provides 
justification for other components. All of these taken together prop up the new neoliberal 
state that can be described as liberal-paternalist because it advocates deregulation at the 
top of the class hierarchy while being disciplinary at the bottom. Since the neoliberal state 
has failed to fulfil its social and economic roles, it is trying to assert its authority by rolling 
out the prison and its extensions. This also serves to normalize precarious wage labour as 
the modal employment situation for the post-industrial proletariat. 
 The penal turn in America, characterized by the double coupling of 
hyperghettoization and hyperincarceration on the one hand and workfare and prisonfare on 
the other, is severely damaging to the communities it attacks, but also to the American 
society as a whole. It is self-defeating because it creates more inmates when striking the 
communities it is supposed to reform (according to Foucault, producing new criminals is 
exactly the role that modern prisons have been assigned) and perpetuates the disorders and 
insecurity it is supposed to alleviate. The penal turn is also financially counterproductive 
because it consumes the funds needed for essential public services such as healthcare, 
education, and social protection. The state chose to penalize the emerging form of poverty 
in the post-Civil rights era but this was not the only method. It could have also chosen to 
socialize it by addressing its structural causes or medicalize it by treating individuals. 
Research has shown that rehabilitation is superior to retribution, but this is still not widely 
accepted, which is why a public campaign is needed. A deep justice reform is also necessary 
but in order to be successful, it needs to be followed by the restoration of the social and 
economic wings of the state. This can be done by investing in healthcare, education, social 
services and institutions providing drug and alcohol rehabilitation. Another way in which 
restoration of inner city communities could be achieved is through a “Works Progress 
Administration-style public works program aimed at the vestiges of the historic Black Belt” 
that would help to “rebuild its decrepit infrastructure, to improve housing conditions, and to 
offer economic sustenance and civic incorporation to local residents” (Wacquant, “Class, 
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Race and Hyperincarceration” 85). Other ways for dismantling the penal state would be 
restoring prison college programs (a college degree has shown to be the best antidote to 
reoffending), treating mentally ill low-level offenders in medical facilities, re-establishing 
programs such as educational release and work release that help inmates return to the 
civilian life and stopping the self-defeating policy of re-arresting inmates for technical 
violations of the administrative conditions of their release. 
 
3. Representation of the Penal State in The Wire 
 
 American cultural production has had to keep up with the reality of the carceral 
boom that has affected millions of its citizens. Plenty of new cultural products have arisen in 
response to this phenomenon. The most disheartening of those is the introduction of a new 
character whose father is incarcerated to Sesame Street, a popular children’s show. More 
than 2.7 million American children were able to relate to Alex, the new character, since this 
was the number of children who had a parent in jail or prison. Other than that, there have 
been many successful fictional and non-fictional works of art set in the prison in the last 25 
years. Some of the more popular fictional TV shows in this setting include Prison Break, Oz, 
and Orange is the New Black. The latter has been lauded as an accurate portrayal of 
incarceration but critics have also noted its tendency to ascribe causes of imprisonment to 
character flaws rather than structural inequality. Other new TV shows, such as Atlanta, are 
not set in the prison but convincingly illustrate poverty and unemployment in the inner city. 
American TV drama The Wire is another one of those TV shows concerned with crime and 
punishment in modern USA.  
 Set in Baltimore, Maryland, The Wire explores various institutions of a post-industrial 
American city throughout its five-season run. These institutions are law enforcement, the 
city port, City Hall, the public school system and the print news media. Much has been 
written about The Wire, both inside and outside of academia. It has been lauded for its 
complex and three-dimensional characters, multi-layered plots, and realistic style. The latter 
is one of the most praised aspects of the series. This realism was achieved by casting local 
actors that were not familiar to viewers, casting real-life ex-offenders, and avoiding stylistic 
figures such as voice-overs, flashbacks or extradiegetic music, except in final montages. It 
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was also bolstered by the fact that its creators, David Simon and Ed Burns, were participants 
in the institutions depicted by The Wire – Simon was a police reporter for The Baltimore Sun 
and Burns was a former homicide detective and a public school teacher. The series 
comments on many broad themes – some of them are deindustrialization, the war on drugs, 
and the collapse of institutions.  
 The series can be described as a police procedural at first glance but it is much more 
complex than that – it has been compared to the Greek tragedy, the visual novel, and the 
Victorian novel. Its scope allows it to address systemic, interconnected issues that plague 
the modern American city in ways that scholarly research cannot because it has to focus on 
a single aspect of the city. This is why The Wire is being taught in college courses on 
anything from public education or criminal justice to sociology. Its scope also allows it to 
capture the systemic urban inequality that arose as a result of concentration effects; urban 
sociologists have found out that “various processes associated with concentrated poverty 
work together to produce uniquely severe disadvantage for residents of these 
neighbourhoods” (Chaddha and Wilson 174). Even though there are few scenes set in the 
prison in the Wire, the show is still an accurate illustration of the penal state. This is because 
it shows the structural causes of poverty in inner-city African American communities, which 
serve as the primary recruiting grounds for the nation’s prisons. These structural causes, as 
described in the first chapter, are economic, social, and political. More precisely, they 
include racial segregation, deindustrialization, white flight, inadequate public schools, lack 
of political representation, and disproportionate incarceration of African Americans.  
 Since The Wire tackles the structural issues of the hyperghetto, it provides a truthful 
and accurate representation of systemic urban inequality that is perpetuated by the penal 
state. For example, the series shows how African Americans involved in the drug trade are 
repeatedly arrested. Young black males selling drugs on the streets (“corner kids”) like 
Preston “Boadie” Broadus, Randy Wagstaff and Little Kevin are often brought to the 
interrogation room, where the investigators are trying to elicit confessions, mostly to no 
avail. These low-level arrests are useless in abolishing the drug trade but they are a 
necessity in order to strengthen the statistics which falsely show that the city is safer. High-
level police commanders are repeatedly asked by politicians to produce measurable 
decreases in crime, which is why they focus on these futile arrests. These statistics, 
measured by the CompStat system in The Wire, determine much of the police work. High 
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ranking police officers like Major William Rawls are focused exclusively on clearance rates 
and openly resist the protagonist Jimmy McNulty in his initiative to investigate the Barksdale 
organization, which would lead to significant disruptions in the drug trade. They are not 
interested in making the city safer, only in creating that illusion, in order to serve politicians’ 
and consequently their own interests. Since these arrests have harmful economic and social 
consequences on offenders and their families, they only perpetuate the systemic urban 
inequality. Even when the highest ranking gangsters in the drug trade like Avon Barksdale 
and Marlo Stanfield are arrested, the communities are not shown to be safer. The drug 
trade continues with different players and the communities still struggle with addiction and 
other concentrated effects of disadvantage. 
 Some of the other major causes of disadvantage in the hyperghetto shown in the 
series are joblessness and social isolation. The Wire shows that deindustrialization has had 
devastating consequences on both black and white communities, but makes it clear that 
black communities have been hit harder. Season 2, which follows the mostly white 
community of stevedores in the city port, shows how deindustrialization has negatively 
impacted the blue-collar working class. In absence of work, they have turned to illegal 
activities in order to survive. However, they still maintain an attachment to jobs, the union, 
and political representatives. This provides them with access to a social network and 
institutions that inner-city residents do not have. As a result, the latter have engaged in 
dealing drugs, which is the only source of income for many black characters in the show. The 
deep unemployment and the resulting poverty of the residents of the hyperghetto also 
caused their social isolation: 
  
 As joblessness climbed, formal organizations that had depended on the support of 
 middle-class residents were weakened, thus undermining social organization in the 
 inner city, including important institutions such as churches, schools, businesses, and 
 civic clubs. As a greater percentage of the residents were jobless, they had fewer 
 social ties to individuals employed in the formal labor market who could provide 
 information on and access to job opportunities. (Chaddha and Wilson 173) 
 
There are many examples of social isolation in The Wire. The corner kids and other 
participants in the drug trade are almost never seen outside of the hyperghetto or the 
27 
 
prison; the rare occasions when they are, like when Michael Lee, Duquan “Dukie” Weems 
and Bug go to an amusement park, only underscore this social isolation (5.03). Another 
instance of this is when Major Howard “Bunny” Colvin takes three of the corner kids from 
the special program to a high-class restaurant; they are overwhelmed by the atmosphere 
and fail to understand the proper etiquette (4.09). Social isolation is perhaps most 
powerfully expressed in a poignant exchange between Dukie and Dennis “Cutty” Wise in 
Season 5: 
 
 Cutty: World is bigger than that, at least that’s what they tell me. 
 Dukie: Like, how do you get from here to the rest of the world? 
 Cutty: I wish I knew. (5.05) 
 
Both characters are trying to leave the world of drug and crime. Cutty is an ex-convict who 
used to be a “soldier” in the Barksdale organization. After leaving the prison, he tries to find 
gainful employment but the only job opportunities are in the underground economy – the 
first job he takes is again from the Barksdale empire. He cannot be reintegrated into society, 
as Wacquant explains, because there was no social structure to accommodate him even 
before he went to prison. Dukie is an eight-grader who tries his best to stay off the streets. 
He tries to get a job in the shoe store but is rejected because he is underage. At the end of 
the last season, he is shown using heroin. Due to joblessness and other structural 
disadvantages, death is the only way for most of the participants to leave the drug game, 
like in the cases of D’Angelo Barksdale and Wallace. According to the discourse of PRWORA, 
the only way to attain personal responsibility is by finding gainful employment. The Wire 
shows that this is impossible for many residents in the inner city. 
 The Wire serves as a powerful indictment of the personal responsibility ideology 
because it shows how structural disadvantages combine to create a systemic inequality 
unique in the history of the USA. This context of systemic urban inequality, in turn, shapes 
the actions, beliefs and attitudes of those trapped in it. This idea that outcomes of poor 
blacks are shaped by structural inequality is not universally accepted; almost half of all 
Americans (49%) still believe that blacks who can’t get ahead in the USA are mostly 
responsible for their own condition (Pew Research Center). This percentage is largely 
shaped by Republicans; seventy-five per cent of them believe that statement to be true. The 
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Wire proves that these views are incorrect by showing that institutions, circumstances and 
social settings, rather than the work ethic and moral values, shape the actions of the poor. It 
also proves this by showing complex, three-dimensional characters like Dukie and D’Angelo 
who want to leave the drug trade but fail to do so, not through their personal flaws but due 
to their relationships to their families, institutions, and neighbourhood. Similarly, individuals 
working against the corrupt and decaying institutions also face insurmountable obstacles. 
Detectives McNulty and Lester Freamon are sabotaged in their desires to do actual police 
work by their superiors. Mayor Thomas Carcetti starts out planning to change the corrupt 
system but becomes part of it when he finds out he relies on the public and a wide variety 
of political coalitions to stay in power. Professor Roland Pryzbylewski and Major Colvin are 
held back from their attempts to teach and reform children in the public school – they are 
forced to teach the children to memorize standardized test questions instead, in order to 
improve the school’s score in official metrics by which they are measured. Gus Haynes, the 
principled editor of the Baltimore Sun in Season 5, wants to report on important stories 
from the city but is prevented by the editorial board focused on impact journalism and 
winning awards. Furthermore, all of these institutions struggle with a lack of resources – a 
direct result of Reagan’s New Federalism policies and cutting fiscal support to city 
governments. This vast array of interconnected storylines and characters build The Wire’s 
argument that policies based on personal responsibility are damaging because individuals 
have little individual autonomy due to the institutions and social settings that govern their 
actions. However, there is one group of characters that is not given the same charitable 
treatment as others – African American mothers. 
 Black men have often been stereotypically represented in news media, popular 
culture and political discourse as dangerous, devious, and sexual predators. Similarly, black 
women have been represented as either too dependent, as in the case of the “welfare 
queen” or too independent, as in the stereotype of the matriarch. The Wire takes great 
effort to dispel stereotypes about black men by building a cast of complex characters on 
both sides of the law. While most of the women in the series are represented in their 
relationship to men (e.g. as lovers or family members), there are also some remarkable 
female characters. The most notable of them are Shakima Greggs, a black lesbian detective, 
and Felicia “Snoop” Pearson, a cold-blooded killer whose appearance, behaviour and actions 
are defying traditional gender roles. However, African American mothers are not granted 
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the same representational ambiguity as other characters in the show. While the series 
shows why the characters make the choices they do without casting judgement, black 
mothers are reduced to “stereotypes of pathological non-normativity: irresponsible, 
irrational, and emasculating” (Ault 388). Furthermore, their desires and attempts for self-
preservation are directly linked to their sons’ negative outcomes. Most of these depictions 
are in Season 4, which is focused on the fates of four fatherless boys. This season builds a 
powerful argument that the outcomes of young black males are already sealed from the 
start and have nothing to do with their work ethic or moral values. Instead, they are victims 
of systemic urban inequality and decaying institutions in the dilapidated inner city. One of 
the factors influencing their outcomes, according to the series, is the black family structure. 
This view echoes the Moynihan Report by asserting that black matriarchy is causing the 
negative outcomes of black youth. According to the report, encouraging proper black 
fatherhood is the solution for a variety of issues plaguing the inner-city, including high levels 
of crime and unemployment as well as low levels of academic success. The Wire agrees with 
this by showing that the only way the protagonists of Season 4 can be saved is through 
heteronormative and patriarchal domesticity. 
 Namond Brice, Randy, Dukie and Michael – the protagonists of Season 4 – are 
fatherless, much like the other “soldiers” in the Barksdale criminal enterprise. Furthermore, 
their mothers failed “in one of a mother’s primary duties: creating a safe domestic space for 
their sons” (Ault 393). However, the first prominent example of bad African American 
motherhood comes in the first season. Detective Jimmy McNulty and Lieutenant Cedric 
Daniels visit Darcia Wallace, mother of a low-level drug dealer referred to as “Wallace” in 
the series. The police officers went out looking for Wallace, a drug dealer turned informant, 
because they sensed that he was in danger. His mother, however, is oblivious of this danger; 
she is more concerned about the ten dollars that he took from her (in order to support his 
addiction). While she is talking to the police officers, a male voice is heard from the room, 
asking what’s going on: 
 
 Unidentified male: What’s going on out there? 
 Darcia Williams: Nothing. Couple of police interrupting me while I'm trying to get my 
 drink on. 
 Cedric Daniels: Look, your son might be in some danger. 
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 Darcia Williams: He gonna be in some danger right here if he shows up. Snatched 
 that ten out of my purse without asking. I’ll slap the bright out of his eyes. (1.12) 
 
The presence of an unidentified male (implying sexual deviance), along with a disregard for 
her son’s well-being, paints Darcia Wallace as a typical “welfare queen.” This uncaring 
attitude is shown to directly influence Wallace’s death; the scene described above is shown 
immediately after the scene of his murder. 
 The second example of bad African American motherhood is shown in the fourth 
season. Michael’s mother is a drug addict who cannot be trusted with the family’s food 
stamps. As a result of her irresponsible behaviour, Michael is the primary caretaker to his 
younger stepbrother Bug. His mother, who is not even given a name in the series, is a typical 
example of the “welfare queen” stereotype, evidenced by her drug addiction, uncaring 
attitude towards her children, and unemployment. When Bug’s father returns from the 
prison, she accepts him in the house despite Michael’s objection: 
 
 Michael: You swore he wasn't coming back. 
 Michael’s mother: This is a good thing, Michael. It's going to be back the way it was. 
 Michael: The way it was?  
 Michael’s mother: We a family again. (4.08) 
 
The last comment by Michael’s mother can be read as an assertion that matriarchies are not 
real families; they became a family again only when Bug’s father returned. However, since 
Bug’s father is not Michael’s father, their new family is not conforming to standard norms of 
patriarchal and nuclear families. This non-normative sexuality is another stereotype typically 
applied to figures of “welfare queens” and matriarchs. Later in the series, she expresses the 
same uncaring attitude and obliviousness to the danger her child is in like Darcia Wallace 
does in the first season: 
 
 Cutty: You Michael Lee's mother? 
 Michael’s mother: He got papers on him?  
 Cutty: I ain't police. I'm just looking for him. 
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 Michael’s mother: You ain't alone. He booked on out of here, got his own spot, took 
 his little brother with him. 
 Cutty: You know where he stay at?  
 Michael’s mother: He ain't tell me. You find the boy, you let him know I need some 
 help. I popped him and Bug out my ass and now they forgot where they came from. 
 (4.12) 
 
This sequence paints her as a typical “welfare queen” who cares about her children only 
because they guarantee her federal and state aid (Ault 394). Since Michael was sexually 
abused by Bug’s father, he seeks protection in the criminal organization led by Marlo 
Stanfield. This creates a direct link between his mother’s sexual behaviour and his 
involvement in the drug trade.  
 One of the examples of a matriarch in The Wire is Brianna Barksdale. She discourages 
her son D’Angelo from joining the Witness Protection Program and forces him to plead 
guilty to charges against him in order to protect the Barksdale criminal organization. She 
stresses the importance of the drug trade not only for providing them with the means for 
survival but also for enabling them to be a family in the first place: 
 
 Brianna Barksdale: This right here is part of the game, Dee. And without the game 
 this whole family would be down in the fucking Terrace living off scraps. Shit, we 
 probably wouldn't even be a family. Start over? How the fuck you going to start over 
 without your peoples? Without your own child, even? If you ain't got family in this 
 world, what the hell you got? (1.13) 
 
In the last sentence, the family she refers to is the Barksdale organization. Ironically, she 
encourages him to take the fall for his Barksdale “family” which results in his murder and 
prevents him from having a heteronormative, nuclear and patriarchal family with his 
girlfriend Donette and their son. Since Brianna encouraged him to do this, she is directly 
linked to his death. Due to her power and influence over her son, Brianna represents the 
stereotype of the black matriarch. 
 Perhaps the most prominent example of a black matriarch in the series is Namond’s 
mother, De’Londa Brice. When her husband, Roland “Wee-Bey” Brice, is incarcerated, she 
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tries to push Namond into the drug trade so she can continue to pursue her lifestyle of 
material luxury: 
 
 De’Londa Brice: You gonna have to step up now, Na'. 
 Namond: A'ight. 
 De’Londa Brice: Be the man of the family. You older than your daddy was when he 
 went out on the corner. (4.06) 
 
De’Londa pressures him to attain personal responsibility and become “the man of the 
family” by finding employment. She is shown to be unwilling to take responsibility for 
herself, choosing instead to depend on her husband and son for her luxurious lifestyle – a 
stereotype applied to the “welfare queen” figure. A more charitable reading of De’Londa, 
and by extension the show’s writers, is expressed by Courtney D. Marshall. She asserts that, 
in absence of a legitimate economy in the inner city, African American mothers are forced to 
encourage their children to participate in the underground economy. In capitalism, mothers 
are assigned the responsibility to ensure the system a steady supply of labour and teach 
their children civic values, even if those values and labour are criminalized. When we take 
the season’s ending in account, the first reading seems more in line with the intentions of 
the show’s writers; Namond is taken away from De’Londa with Wee-Bey’s approval and 
adopted by Colvin, who is now retired. As opposed to De’Londa, Colvin’s wife “takes care of 
household tasks and speaks softly: she knows her place” (397 Ault). Unlike Michael, Dukie 
and Randy, Namond is saved from the streets. He is saved by the combined fatherly efforts 
of Colvin and Wee-Bey. In a rare didactic moment, The Wire encourages patriarchal and 
nuclear families as the antidote to corrupt and decaying government institutions. In doing 
so, it paints African American mothers as irresponsible and blames them for their sons’ 
negative outcomes. These stereotypes perpetuate the ideology of personal responsibility, 
an important aspect of the penal state. 
 Another example of the show encouraging patriarchal families is the sheer number 
of surrogate father figures in the show; Wallace is the primary caretaker for a group of 
orphans; Michael is his brother’s primary caretaker; Bubbles takes young boys under his 
wing and teaches them how to survive in the streets; Major Colvin adopts Namond; Cutty 
tries to keep corner kids from the streets by providing them with his gym; Sergeant Ellis 
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Carver tries to adopt Randy but is unable due to the failure of institutions; Professor 
Pryzbylewski washes Dukie’s laundry and buys him new clothes. All of these examples of 
caring and nurturing men trying to keep the young boys on the “straight and narrow track” 
are in stark contrast with the African American mothers of the show. They are depicted as 
irresponsible, uncaring and selfish, and these characteristics are directly linked to the young 
boys’ suffering. Unlike the mothers, some of these men managed to create a safe domestic 
space for the corner kids. While the series goes to great lengths to show us why the African 
Americans trapped in the inner city make the choices they do, the same empathy is not 
extended to black mothers. This may be in part due to the fact that female writers were 
greatly outnumbered by male writers on the show. 
 Along with the ideology of personal responsibility, another very important aspect of 
the penal state is surveillance. As mentioned in the second chapter, the government 
monitors and thus controls the targeted population not only through incarceration but also 
through criminal databases, probation, parole, police patrolling, CCTV cameras and so on. 
Likewise, surveillance is a very important aspect of The Wire, which is emphasized in the 
title of the show. The titular wire refers to the wiretap – a surveillance method employed by 
the series’ protagonists. The wiretap, according to Carlo Rotella, is a new addition to 
conventional crime-story forms – street policing and “the box” – that invites viewers to 
question these old forms and see the bigger picture. In the 1970s and 1980s, series such as 
Kojak, Police Story, and Hill Street Blues represented law enforcement to mostly rely on 
street policing – patrolling the streets, gathering knowledge, recruiting informants, and 
monitoring suspects. These series investigated the possibility of a social contract 
endangered by the urban crises. In the 1990s, another form dominated the police 
procedural – the interrogation room, colloquially known as “the box.” This aspect 
problematized the question of narrowing individual rights in a time of crisis by showing 
police officers creatively violating suspects’ rights. Both of these forms are present in The 
Wire, but they are shown to be ineffective in dealing with the root of organized crime in 
Baltimore – the symbiosis between high-level drug dealers and corrupt politicians, lawyers 
and businessmen. The Wire shows us that these old forms of policing that result in 
imprisonment of low-level offenders only perpetuate the ailments that the War on Drugs 
was nominally supposed to alleviate. Instead, it invites the viewer to mistrust genre 
pleasures (e.g. action sequences, dramatic interrogation) of the police procedural and 
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engage in the structural analysis of deep crime that the wiretap enables. This is best 
illustrated in the character of Lester Freamon, who brings the corrupt Senator Clay Davis to 
trial by “following the money.” This involves actions that make for great police work but 
dreadful TV – investigating corporation charter papers, records of political contributions, 
and real estate transactions. Meanwhile, the busts of low-level corner kids, apprehended by 
equally low-level officers such as detectives Herc and Carver, bring nothing of value and only 
serve to perpetuate inner-city problems.  
 The Wire offers a critique of surveillance but its stance differs from traditional ideas 
in surveillance studies. The latter contends that “proliferation of security cameras in public 
spaces denotes a concurrent proliferation of the power structure behind the lens” 
(Ravenscroft 303). It also views this proliferation as proof of a panoptic society. On the other 
hand, The Wire argues that society has turned a blind eye on “the dark corner of the 
American experiment,” as homicide detective Sargeant Jay Landman puts it (3.03). As 
evidenced by the cracked CCTV camera in the title credits sequence of the show (and in the 
final montage of the very last episode), security cameras do not have the same function in 
all public spaces. In this sequence, shown at the beginning of every episode, a low-level drug 
dealer in the Barksdale organization by the name of Boadie Broadus throws a rock at the 
CCTV camera in the public housing projects and cracks the lens. This event is never brought 
up in the series and Boadie is never punished for it. That is because the CCTV in the inner 
city does not serve to normalize behaviour or as an instrument of the panopticon; it serves 
as an empty threat of punishment. It even invites subversion of authority by the observed 
residents. While security cameras serve as a guarantee of security in places such as 
shopping malls, the cameras that overlook street corners and housing developments in this 
section of Baltimore only illustrate the lack of control by the law enforcement and the 
abandonment by the government. Instead of offering protection and monitoring where it is 
most needed, the State has shifted its gaze to its most vulnerable citizens – welfare 
recipients – whose surveillance has increased with “computer registration, drug tests, and 
documentation of sexual behavior, among other things” (Ravenscroft 306). As opposed to 
visions of a panoptic society, The Wire shows that surveillance has failed to “fulfill the liberal 
democratic goal of making the socially hidden visible” due to systemic blindness to the 
impoverished areas of the city (Stacy 173). 
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Conclusion 
 
 At the end of the 20th century, the United States of America has shifted from a 
welfare state to a penal state. This is evidenced primarily by a four-fold increase in 
incarceration while the crime remained constant. The welfare system was overhauled three 
times before the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996. 
Those reforms were preceded by discussions that often relied on stereotypical 
representations of impoverished African Americans. The punitive welfare reform of the 
1990s was provided justification by invoking the stereotype of the “welfare queen” and the 
ideology of personal responsibility. The latter, according to Loïc Wacquant is one of the 
cornerstones of the new neoliberal state, along with prisonfare, market rule, and workfare. 
This new neoliberal state failed to provide social and economic security so it relies on 
prisonfare – the aggressive rolling out of prisons and its extensions – to re-establish the 
sovereignty of the state, normalize precarious labour and alleviate the social insecurity of 
the post-Civil rights era. 
 As evidenced by a plethora of academic texts written about it, The Wire’s extensive 
scope and depth make it a valuable text for examining many aspects of the modern 
American city. There are many ways to explore the penal state in The Wire - in this thesis I 
have focused on the ideology of personal responsibility because it is an important aspect 
which provides justification for the penal state. In illustrating the life conditions of poor 
black inner-city residents – primary targets of the penal state – the show successfully 
portrays the systemic urban inequality concentrated in this place. It shows how this 
concentrated disadvantage restricts their actions and impedes their individual autonomy. 
The Wire shows that, contrary to beliefs of half the Americans, blacks who can’t get ahead in 
the USA are not mostly responsible for their own condition. This is how the series positions 
itself against the ideology of personal responsibility – except in the case of black mothers. 
They are shown as irresponsible and their desires are directly linked to their sons’ negative 
outcomes. They are represented through the stereotypes of the black matriarch and the 
“welfare queen,” which follows the discourse of the Moynihan Report and PRWORA. The 
only way their children can survive, according to the series, is through heteronormative, 
patriarchal and nuclear families. The series also comments on surveillance, another 
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important aspect of the penal state. It rejects the view that we live in a panoptic society 
since the state remains willfully blind to the impoverished areas of the city. 
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